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LABOR productivity  growth  for the private  economy as a whole seems to 
have stopped altogether. In the first half of 1982 the U.S.  Bureau of 
Labor  Statistics  index of private  sector labor  productivity  was below its 
1977 level. Productivity  has stagnated  for five years. Weak aggregate 
demand  has been an ingredient  in this stagnation,  but cannot account 
for much of it. Even in the 1930s  there was only a four-year  stagnation 
of productivity  accompanying  a much more severe fall in demand. By 
1934,  productivity  was above its 1929  level. 
This paper  is part  of a continuing  research  project  to understand  and 
explain  the slowdown. In earlier  work  I looked at the aggregate  picture.  I 
In this paper I report on the behavior of productivity  at the industry 
level-the  major  industry  groups  and  the two-digit  manufacturing  indus- 
tries. In future  work I will analyze the behavior  of individual  firms  and 
establishments. 
The paper  focuses on the following  questions. (1) Does the incidence 
of the productivity  slowdown by industry  suggest that capital services 
have declined relative to the capital stock? (2) Does it suggest that the 
rate  of technical  change  has slowed?  (3) Have responses  to the increased 
cost of energy been a major  cause of the slowdown?  (4) Have changes 
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in  the  distribution  of output  or  employment  among  industries  contributed 
to the slowdown  in aggregate  labor  productivity? 
The Analytical Framework 
For expositional  convenience, the analytical  framework  is developed 
using Cobb-Douglas  production  functions. All numerical  estimates de- 
rived subsequently allow factor shares to change over time and so 
assume only that the production  function is well behaved and exhibits 
constant  returns  to scale.2 
Output  in industry  i is Qi  and  is produced  by capital  services, KSi, and 
labor  services, Li, with the following  specification: 
(  1  )  Qi = Aieyi' (KS) I  - oi  Lioi, 
where Ai is a constant, -y,  is the rate of technical change, and (xi  is the 
labor  coefficient. Using lowercase letters to denote logarithmic  rates of 
change, equation 1 implies 
(2)  qi =  y1 +  (1 -  oti)ksi +  otili. 
There is no direct observation  of capital services, but there is data on 
the capital stock, Ki. The ratio of capital  services to the capital  stock is 
called  KRi; its rate  of change  is expressed as 
(3)  kri =  ksi -  ki. 
CAPITAL  AND  LABOR  PRODUCTIVITY 
I next define a concept called capital and labor productivity,  KLP, 
with a rate of change given by 
(4)  klpi  =  qi-  (1 -  o)ki  -  oili. 
The KLP concept is clearly similar  to that of total factor productivity, 
which is widely used in the literature.  I use the term  KLP because the 
growth  rate  of KLP depends  not only upon the rate  of technical  change, 
2. This issue is clarified  in Barbara  M. Fraumeni  and Dale W. Jorgenson,  "Capital 
Formation  and  U. S. Productivity  Growth,  1948-1976,  " in  Ali  Dogramaci,  ed., Productivity 
Analysis: A Range of Perspectives  (Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishing,  1981),  pp. 49-70. -_=  >t**  ..  s  I  -s  --..t  I  -- 
but also upon movements in KR, the ratio of capital services to the 
capital  stock. 
Substituting  equations  3 and  4 into 2 gives 
(5)  klpi =  yi +  (1  -  oi)kri. 
As shown  below, the rate  of growth  of KLP  has decreased  in most of the 
industries  in the private  business sector of the U.S. economy since 1973. 
The symbol /\ denotes the change in the rate of growth of a variable 
between two periods, so that 
(6)  zklpi  =  A-yi  +  (1 -  cx) Akri. 
The variation  in KLP  growth  is then the sum  of the variations  in the rate 
of technical  change  and  in the rate  of change  of the capital  services ratio 
weighted  by capital  intensity. 
DIFFERENCES  IN  CAPITAL  INTENSITY 
If there were no changes  in any of the -yi  and  if A\kri  was the same  in all 
industries, the magnitudes  of the KLP declines by industry  would de- 
pend upon the oxi.  In other words, if there has been a general decline 
in the ratio of capital services to the capital stock since 1973,  the KLP 
slowdown  will have been greatest  in the capital-intensive  industries. 
DIFFERENCES  IN  THE  BEHAVIOR  OF 
THE  CAPITAL  SERVICES  RATIO 
It is unlikely  that changes  in kri  were in fact the same in all industries. 
One reason for differences might  be differences  in energy intensity. If 
much of the old capital stock has had to be replaced  by more energy- 
efficient capital, and if the measurement  of the capital stock does not 
take this obsolescence into account, the measured  capital  services ratio 
will have fallen. This ratio  will also have fallen  if recent  investment,  and 
hence the measured  capital  stock, has been disproportionately  devoted 
to environmental  protection  rather  than  production,  or if an industry  has 
had to completely retool for a new product  line. One can look across 
industries to  see  if energy intensity or other information  indicates 
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The term A\kri  in equation 6 reflects any breaks in the trend  growth 
rate  of the capital  services ratio, positive or negative. Instead  of asking 
why productivity  growth  slowed down after 1973  one could  just as well 
ask  why growth  was rapid  before 1973.  It could  be that  in some industries 
favorable  factors were allowing  the capital services ratio  to rise before 
1973  and that these favorable movements slowed or ceased after that 
year. 
DECLINES  IN  THE  RATE  OF  TECHNOLOGICAL  CHANGE 
Technological  change reflects improvements  in knowledge that are 
transmitted  in some way to the production  process-by  organizational 
changes or by embodiment  in the capital. Technological  possibilities 
differ in different  industries. Some are mature  and have slow rates of 
growth  and others experience rapid  rates of technical  change. The flow 
of new technology is taking  place primarily  in the industries  with rapid 
growth.  The different  stages of maturity  are illustrated  below. 
The slope of the S-curve in the diagram  indicates  the rate of produc- 
tivity growth  at different  stages in an industry's  life. An industry  with a 
newly  emerging  technology  is near  point  A. A comparison  of time  periods 
will show its productivity  growth  rate beginning  to increase. A mature 
industry,  on the other hand, is one that has already  reached  a point like 
C at the beginning  of the sample period. A comparison  of subperiods 
shows a growth slowdown, but it will be only slight. Industries  that are 
intermediate  between  these cases show rapidly  accelerating  productivity 
growth as they move from A to B,  and then stable but high rates of 
productivity  growth  along  the steep portion  of the curve around  B. They 
show large  slowdowns in growth  as they move from  B to C. 
If the KLP growth slowdown has come about because there have 
been relatively  few if any newly emerging  technologies  in recent years, 
most of the industries  one observes will be beyond the inflection  point 
B. Some of these industries  were already  mature  in the 1950s  and 1960s, 
and will show little slowdown. They were already at point C at the 
beginning  of the sample  period. Industries  that  were on the steep part  of 
the curve in the 1950s  and 1960s  should show large slowdowns as they 
became mature  industries.  If the population  of industries  is dominated 
by firms  in this latter  part of their productivity  cycle, it would indicate 
that  industries  that  were  previously  growing  rapidly  are  becoming  mature Martin  Neil  Baily  427 
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and  that  there  are few newly emerging  technologies.  This  would  explain 
the observed KLP slowdown. 
Another  clue about the source of the slowdown comes from the fact 
that  a negative  rate  of technical  change  seems implausible.  If there  have 
been negative rates of change of KLP in some industries or in the 
aggregate,  then it is unlikely  that  a decline in the flow of new technology 
is the sole reason  for the slowdown. 
LABOR  PRODUCTIVITY 
Average labor productivity,  ALP, is the most familiar  measure of 
productivity.  It is the slowdown in labor  productivity  growth  that calls 
attention  to the productivity  puzzle. Equation  2 implies  that 428  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1982 
(7)  alpi  =  -yi  +  (1 -  oi)(ksi-  1). 
ALP grows at a rate  depending  upon  the rate  of technical  change  and  the 
growth  rate of the ratio  of capital  services to labor  input. Substituting  3 
and  5 into 7, the change  in ALP growth  can be expressed  as 
(8)  lAalpi  =  LAyi  +  (1 -  ot)z\kri +  (1 -  ot) A (ki -  l1) 
=  zklpi  +  (1  -  ot) A (ki -  li). 
The slowdown in labor productivity  growth  is the weighted sum of the 
variations  in the rate  of technical  change,  the rate  of change  of the capital 
services ratio, and the rate of growth  of the ratio  of the capital  stock to 
labor input. The difference between the ALP slowdown and the KLP 
slowdown  is  just the last of these three  terms. If the ratio  of capital  stock 
to labor  grew more  slowly after 1973,  the slowdown  in labor  productivity 
growth  will be greater  than  the slowdown  in KLP  growth.  Hence trends 
in capital  formation  may  help  to explain  the labor  productivity  slowdown 
in particular  industries.3 
THE  EFFECT  OF  DEMAND  FLUCTUATIONS 
When  business firms  vary their  production  as a result  of fluctuations 
in product  demand, there are corresponding  variations  in the intensity 
with which the factors of capital and labor are used. Labor services, 
denoted by L in the preceding discussion, refer to hours worked as 
measured  by the Bureau  of Labor Statistics. During  a period of slack 
demand, actual labor services, denoted by LS, fall before measured 
labor  hours  do because  of labor  hoarding  and  variations  in  work  intensity. 
During a peak period actual labor services will be above L, as extra 
effort is given by the work force. When output is equal to potential 
output (denoted by  Q*), measured labor input (denoted by L*) is 
assumed  to be equal  to actual  labor  services, or L* =  LS*. 
3. With  more  information,  it would  be possible  to make  more  of the gaps  between  the 
ALP and  the KLP slowdowns,  because  for any particular  industry  investment  behavior  is 
influenced  by other changes. For example, an increase in the rate of technical  change 
might stimulate  demand  for the industry's  product  by its effect on prices. This would 
stimulate  capital  formation.  But capital  expenditures  could also be stimulated  by some 
"adverse" event-such  as a new regulation  of the Occupational  Safety and Health 
Administration  (OSHA)-that also leads to a decline  in productivity  growth.  In practice 
the case that  is relevant  is difficult  to determine. Martin  Neil Baily  429 
Because capital  is to some extent putty-clay  in nature,  it follows that 
capital  services also fluctuate  in the short run  with output  fluctuations. 
The preceding model has already distinguished  between the flow of 
capital  services and the capital  stock, so that in principle  weak demand 
could simply be one reason why the ratio of capital services to capital 
stock might  have declined after 1973.  But it makes an important  differ- 
ence whether the decline in output-producing  capital services is the 
result  of low industry  demand  or more permanent  structural  problems. 
The level of capital services achieved when output is at potential is 
denoted  by KS*. It is the movements  of KS*  relative  to the capital  stock, 
K, that  are of primary  interest  in understanding  the slowdown. 
In order to isolate the effects on productivity  trends, I now modify 
equation 1 to allow explicitly for demand  fluctuations.  Actual output, 
Qi,  and  potential  output, QO,  are 
(9)  Qi =  Ai eY  i(KSi) I  - Oi  (LSi)o 
Qi*  =  AieYi'(KSP)1  -  i  (L*)o. 
Actual  and potential  KLP are defined  by 
(10)  ln KLPi =  ln Qi -  oi ln  Li -  (1 -  oxi)  ln  Ki 
In  KLP:* = In Qi*  -  oti  In  LP*  -  (I -  oxi)  In  Ki. 
From  9 and 10  it follows that 
(I11)  In  KLPi*  = In  KLPi -  (I -  oti)In  KS*  oti  In LS.  KS,  Li 
Demand-adjusted  or potential productivity differs from actual KLP 
because of deviations of capital services from their potential  level and 
because  of deviations  of actual  labor  services  from  measured  labor  input. 
Note that these capital  and labor  terms  are not symmetric.  A persistent 
recession, such as the situation  that has occurred  in the past few years, 
will  leave KSi  below KSP.  But  after  several  years  of recession,  one would 
expect Li and LSi to become equal as work practices return  to normal 
and  hoarded  labor  is eliminated. 
In the two-digit manufacturing  industries  there is a straightforward 
way of estimating  KLP*. The Federal  Reserve Board  surveys manufac- 430  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1982 
turers  and  compiles  capacity  utilization  estimates  for each industry.4  As 
an approximation,  the reported  capacity utilization  rate, CU, can be 
taken  as an  estimate  of KSIKS*. The  first  step  in  forming  KLP*,  therefore, 
is to compute UKLP, defined  as 
(12)  In UKLPi =  ln KLPi -  (1 -  oxi)  ln CUi. 
Here ln UKLPi stands for the first two terms in 11 and embodies the 
utilization  adjustment. 
To estimate the last term  in 11, actual  labor services are assumed  to 
differ  from measured  labor  input  when output  or labor  input  grow  faster 
or slower than their usual rates. Two separate regressions were con- 
ducted for each industry to estimate this effect. The ln UKLPi was 
regressed on a cubic in time, representing  ln KLP*,  and each of two 
proxies for ln (LSilLi). In the first  regression  the proxy was the current 
qi and qi(-  1), with means adjusted  to equal zero. In the second regres- 
sion, the proxy was 1i  and lQ(-  1), with means again adjusted  to equal 
zero. Then two alternative  estimates of KLP* were formed  as ln KLP* 
ln UKLPi  +  estimated  term  for aiJln(LSi1Li)]. The two estimates of 
KLP* were then averaged.S 
Outside the manufacturing  sector there are no similar  measures of 
capacity utilization. One could try to  impute such measures from 
labor  input data, but this procedure  was not used because it was found 
that whether  or not the capital  stock in manufacturing  was adjusted  for 
utilization  did not result in major  changes in the results. Regressions  of 
ln KLP on the growth  rates of output  or labor  input  will pick up most of 
the short-run  effects of changes in the utilization  of capital as well as 
picking up the gap between L and LS.  So for the major industries, 
regression  results of the sort described  above for adjusting  for cyclical 
variation  in LSIL were used to provide  proxies for all effects of demand 
on productivity,  including  those coming  from  capital  utilizations.6 
4. The  utilization  rates  were  normalized  to have  a mean  of unity.  The  Board  has  figures 
for  only 14  of the 20  two-digit  industries.  Five of the  remaining  six industries  were  classified 
as either primary  or advanced  processing  industries,  and the utilization  rates for these 
subaggregates  were used. The tobacco industry shows little sign of cyclical demand 
fluctuations  and so its capital  stock was not adjusted  for utilization. 
5. The  two estimates  were made  and  averaged  because  either  one alone  has  a potential 
bias. When productivity  is the dependent  variable,  measurement  errors  in Q (or L) will 
result  in positive  (or negative)  correlation  between  q (or 1)  and  the disturbance. 
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These fairly elaborate  adjustments  for demand  were made because 
demand  fluctuations  have been large  and their effects could have been 
important.  However, the incidence of the slowdown across industries 
turns  out to be quite  robust  to the form  of the demand  adjustment  that  is 
made  or even to whether  or not an adjustment  is made. The inferences 
discussed in the paper  were not created  by the demand  adjustment. 
The Slowdown in the Major Industries 
The productivity  slowdown can be described  for the different  indus- 
tries by three statistics derived from the preceding  analysis: the slow- 
down in labor productivity  growth, the KLP slowdown, and the KLP* 
slowdown-the  KLP slowdown  adjusted  for  demand  fluctuations.  Table 
1 describes the productivity  growth slowdown in the major industry 
groups of the private business sector using these statistics.7  The table 
indicates  the following  general  results. 
The slowdown is pervasive. Only  one industry  shows an acceleration 
of labor productivity growth and only two an acceleration of KLP* 
growth. 
The KLP slowdown is smaller  (in absolute  magnitude)  than  the labor 
productivity  slowdown  in  all  industries  except manufacturing  and  nonrail 
transportation.  This indicates  that outside of manufacturing  some slow- 
ing of the rate  of capital  accumulation  relative  to the rate  of employment 
from  the natural  rate in the adjustment  regression  to determine  if it showed  the effect of 
persistent  economic  slack  on productivity  in each  of the major  industries.  The  variable  did 
poorly.  Its coefficient  was  rarely  significant  and  fluctuated  in sign  from  industry  to industry, 
so I omitted  it. The estimate  of the natural  rate  of unemployment  used  was from  Robert  J. 
Gordon,  "Inflation,  Flexible  Exchange  Rates, and  the Natural  Rate  of Unemployment," 
in Martin  Neil Baily, ed., Workers,  Jobs, and  Infi!ation  (Brookings  Institution,  1982),  pp. 
89-152. 
7. I am grateful  to the American  Productivity  Center and its contractor,  Elliot S. 
Grossman,  for supplying  the output  and  labor  input  data  used in this study  and  the capital 
stock data for the major  industries.  The measure  of capital  includes  the gross stock of 
equipment  and structures  plus land and inventory.  See John  W. Kendrick  and Elliot S. 
Grossman, Productivity in the United States: Trends  and Cycles (Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1980),  and the American  Productivity  Center,  Multiple  Input  Productivity  Index, 
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Table  1. The Productivity  Growth  Slowdown  in the Private  Business  Sector, 
by Major  Industry  Group, 1953-73 to 1973-81a 
Percentage  points per year 
Capital  Adjusted  capital 
and labor  and labor 
Labor  productivity,  productivity, 
Industry  productivity  KLP  KLP* 
Agriculture  - 0.83  - 0.35  - 0.92 
Mining  - 8.00  - 4.93  - 5.08 
Construction  - 3.98  - 3.73  - 3.70 
Manufacturing  -  1.43  -  1.70  -  1.20 
Railroads  -2.41  -  1.81  -  1.28 
Nonrail transportation  -  1.30  -  1.40  -0.87 
Communications  0.08  1.12  1.09 
Public  utilities  -4.93  -3.97  -3.82 
Trade  -2.25  -  1.93  -  1.81 
Finance  and insurance  -  1.24  -0.63  -0.61 
Real estate  -2.10  - 0.32  - 0.06 
Services  -0.49  0.09  0.21 
Source:  Computed by the author as described  in the text. 
a.  Differences  between  productivity  growth rates in 1973-81 and  1953-73. 
growth  since 1973  has contributed  to the labor  productivity  slowdown.8 
The KLP  slowdowns remain large, however. Capital accumulation 
explains  only a small  part  of the slowdown  in labor  productivity. 
Except  for  agriculture  and  mining,  the  demand  adjustment  does reduce 
the size of the slowdown, although  the magnitude  of the adjustment  is 
generally  small. The KLP* for agriculture  is included  for completeness 
only. It does not make much sense to adjust this industry, so the 
unadjusted  figure  is used in the remainder  of this paper. 
The growth  rates of labor  productivity  and  KLP are not shown in the 
table, but they reveal that four industries  have negative  growth  rates of 
KLP* during  1973-81  and two more have negative  growth  rates during 
1977-81.9  This provides  fairly  strong  evidence that there  is more  occur- 
ring  than  merely  a decline in the rate  of technical  change.  A cessation of 
new technical  advance  would  not  by itself  result  in negative  KLP growth. 
8. The absolute  magnitude  of the KLP slowdown  is larger  than  the labor  slowdown  in 
communications.  But this also indicates  that  the ratio  of capital  stock to labor  grew  more 
slowly after 1973. 
9. These growth  rates  are available  from  the author  on request. Martin Neil  Baily  433 
THE  PATTERN  OF  THE  SLOWDOWN  IN 
THE  MAJOR  INDUSTRIES 
The industries  can be grouped  by the magnitude  of their slowdowns 
in KLP* to determine  if any general  characteristics  stand  out: 
Productivity slowdown 
(percentage points 
per year)  Industry 
Small, 1.09  to - 0.35  Communications,  services, real 
estate, agriculture 
Medium, - 0.61 to -  1.81  Finance  and  insurance,  nonrail 
transportation,  manufacturing, 
railroads,  trade 
Large, - 3.70 to - 5.08  Construction,  public  utilities,  mining 
The industries  in the group  with small  slowdowns  are  not "smokestack" 
or heavy industries; nor is the industry at the top of the "medium" 
group-finance  and insurance. They are basically white-collar  indus- 
tries, except for agriculture. There is no evidence of a permanent 
slowdown in agriculture.  According to Barry Bosworth and Robert 
Lawrence,'0  fertilizer  use was reduced  after 1973  because of an energy- 
related price increase. This could account for the temporary  dip in 
productivity  growth  that occurred  in 1973-77. Variation  in the weather 
is the other main  determinant  of this industry's  productivity. 
We know from common observation that transportation,  public 
utilities, and mining  are all heavily involved in energy as producers  or 
consumers of it. And these industries  all had large productivity  slow- 
downs. But data are not available  to test the role of energy in a more 
formal  cross-sectional  analysis of the major  industries. 
The slowdown in mining  is probably  not a mystery. One of the most 
important  determinants  of productivity  in this industry  is the natural 
resource  base, but the capital  stock used here  does not reflect  variations 
in the quality  of that base. In the oil and gas mining  industries  the task 
of finding new reserves and extracting old ones has become more 
10.  Barry P.  Bosworth  and Robert  Z.  Lawrence,  Commodity Prices  and  the New 
Inflation (Brookings Institution,  1982). 434  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1982 
difficult."I  When the price of energy increased, it was economically 
rational  to divert  resources  into  this  industry,  lowering  labor  productivity 
computed  with 1972  prices. Consistent  with  this view, in copper  mining, 
an industry  in which prices have been low rather  than  high,  productivity 
growth  accelerated  after 1973.12 
Public  utilities are an example of an industry  in which declines both 
in the rate of technical change  and in the ratio  of capital  services to the 
stock are important.  Innovation  and  scale economies  were significant  in 
the 1950s  and  early 1960s,  but  these gains  had  been largely  exhausted  by 
the late 1960s.13  As a result  of the sharp  slowdown  in electricity  and  gas 
demand  growth  after 1973,  substantial  excess capacity  developed  in the 
industry; in 1979 there was a 36 percent margin  of spare electricity 
generating  capacity.  14 
The two most puzzling  industries  are trade  and construction.  Trade 
is not an industry  I have looked into, and construction  has resisted my 
efforts and those of others to find an explanation.'5  The collapse of 
construction  productivity  is remarkable  and is understated  in table 1 
because it began  in 1968.  The post-1968  slowdown  in KLP* in this sector 
was - 4.57 percentage  points. This swing means  that  KLP* in 1981  was 
about  the same as it had  been in 1951-52-that is, 34.4 percent  below its 
1968  peak  level. If construction  output  and  labor  input  are  removed  from 
the private  business sector, the growth  rate of labor  productivity  in the 
remaining  aggregate  increases  by 0.25 percentage  point  during  1968-81. 
Removing  construction  reduces  the  post-  1973  slowdown  in  the  remaining 
aggregate  from -  1.99  to -  1.90. 
11. William  D. Nordhaus,  "Oil  and  Economic  Performance  in Industrial  Countries," 
BPEA, 2:1980, pp. 341-88. 
12. See U.S. Department  of Labor,  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  Productivity  Measures 
for Selected  Industries,  1954-79, Bulletin  2093  (U.S. Government  Printing  Office, 1981). 
This  publication  gives labor  productivity  computed  from  gross  output,  not value  added. 
13. Laurits  R. Christensen  and William  H. Greene, "Economies of Scale in U.S. 
Electric  Power  Generation,"  Journal  of Political Economy,  vol. 84 (August  1976),  pt. 1, 
pp. 665-76. 
14.  Andrew S. Carron and Paul W. MacAvoy,  The Decline of Service in the Regulated 
Industries  (Washington,  D.C.: American  Enterprise  Institute,  1981),  p. 50, table  24. 
15. H. Kemble Stokes, Jr., "An Examination  of the Productivity  Decline in the 
Construction  Industry,"  The Review  of Economics  and Statistics,  vol.  63 (November 
1981), pp. 495-502; and Martin  Neil Baily, "The Construction  Industry"  (Brookings 
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Since it has been so hard to find satisfactory explanations of the 
productivity  collapse in construction, data problems have been sug- 
gested  as an explanation.  One  possibility  is that  material  inputs  are  being 
overstated. If that is true, it is not legitimate  to remove construction 
from the aggregate  productivity  measure  because an overstatement  of 
inputs there implies an offsetting overstatement in the output and 
productivity of industries supplying material  to construction (unless 
these inputs are imported). In any case, recent data revisions have 
reduced  the estimated  purchases  of materials,  and  I was unable  to make 
the case that materials  purchases  are still overstated. 
It  has also been suggested  that  the  rise  in  the  deflator  for  nonresidential 
structures  has been overstated since 1968. Since construction  projects 
are all different,  deflating  this sector accurately  is difficult.  If the rise in 
the deflator  has been overstated,  however, it implies  that  real  investment 
has  also been understated.  For  example,  if the error  in the output  deflator 
is such that construction  productivity  has actually  remained  flat since 
1968,  rather  than  falling,  then real  gross fixed nonresidential  investment 
was understated  by 9 percent  by 1981  and  net  investment  was  understated 
as much  as 30 percent.  16 
AN  OVERALL  ASSESSMENT 
Attempts  to correlate  the productivity  slowdowns  in major  industries 
with measurable  characteristics  suggested  by the model, such as capital 
intensity or previous productivity  growth, were unsuccessful. At this 
level of aggregation,  particular  characteristics  of the industries may 
dominate  the results, and, as the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
stresses, the quality  of the data outside manufacturing  is quite poor. In 
addition, the importance  of weather in agriculture  may conceal other 
determinants  of output  and  productivity;  and  the importance  of rents  to 
land  and to mineral  rights  means  the nonlabor  share  of income is a poor 
measure  of capital  intensity  for examining  capital  obsolescence. 
Thus, looking  at the major  industries  of the economy does not reveal 
a clear pattern  that points to the cause of the slowdown. Agriculture, 
communications,  finance,  insurance,  real  estate, and  services as a group 
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have shown no significant  slowdown in KLP* growth. The slowdowns 
in  public  utilities,  mining,  and  transportation  are  reasonably  comprehen- 
sible. Trade  and construction  are puzzles. Although  this paper  does not 
present  detailed  information  on the effects of regulation,  industries  that 
have been greatly  affected  by the impact  of regulatory  restrictions  in the 
1970s-mining (the Federal Coal Mine Health  and Safety Act of 1969), 
construction (building  codes and safety regulations),  and public utili- 
ties-have  all had large slowdowns. This pattern  reappears  among  the 
manufacturing  industries  examined  below. 
The Slowdown in Manufacturing17 
Table 2 provides a description  of the productivity  slowdown in the 
two-digit manufacturing  industries  in the way described earlier.18  The 
table shows the following  general  features. 
The slowdown is pervasive;  in only three  of the twenty industries  did 
labor  productivity  or KLP* speed up after 1973. 
In over half  of the industries  the slowdown  in KLP is greater  than  the 
slowdown in labor productivity,  indicating  that the capital-labor  ratio 
actually grew faster after 1973 than before. This suggests that slow 
capital accumulation  has not been the cause of the labor-productivity 
slowdown in manufacturing.  This result comes about both because of 
fairly strong  investment  in manufacturing  since 1973  and because labor 
input in manufacturing  declined slightly between 1973  and 1980, even 
though  it rose substantially  in the private  business sector as a whole. 
The differences  between the slowdowns  in KLP and  KLP* show that 
the demand adjustment  reduces the magnitude  of the estimated slow- 
17. In writing  this section  I have benefited  from  the work  of Zvi Griliches  and  Jacques 
Mairesse, who have also looked at the slowdown by industry. See Zvi Griliches  and 
Jacques  Mairesse  "Comparing  Productivity  Growth:  An Exploration  of French  and U.S. 
Industrial  and  Firm  Data," paper  presented  at the National  Bureau  of Economic  Research 
Conference, Fifth Annual International  Seminar on Macroeconomics,  University of 
Mannheim,  Germany,  June 1982. 
18. The  equipment  and  structures  data  used  for  the two-digit  manufacturing  industries 
were supplied  by Kenneth  Rogers  of the Department  of Commerce.  Rogers's  data,  unlike 
the Grossman  data,  reflect  the 1980  revisions  of the National  Income  Accounts.  Rogers's 
data stopped  in 1978,  however, so that data for 1979  and 1980  were extrapolated  using 
regressions  on Grossman's  series. Martin  Neil  Baily  437 
Table 2.  The Productivity Growth Slowdown in the Manufacturing Industries, 
1953-73 to 1973-80a 
Percentage points per year 
Adjusted 
Capital  capital 
and labor  and labor 
Industry and  Labor  productivity,  productivity, 
classification  number  productivity  KLP  KLP* 
Food (20)  -2.10  -  2.31  -  1.85 
Tobacco  (21)  -  1.44  -  1.74  -  1.19 
Textiles  (22)  -  1.48  -  1.83  -0.67 
Apparel (23)  1.50  1.27  1.79 
Lumber (24)  -  3.34  -  3.98  -  2.63 
Furniture (25)  1.96  1.76  2.16 
Paper (26)  -  2.42  -  2.94  -  1.76 
Printing (27)  -  2.76  -  2.62  -  2.26 
Chemicals (28)  -  3.28  -  3.76  -  2.71 
Petroleum refining (29)  -5.65  -6.97  -4.86 
Rubber (30)  -  2.90  -  2.98  -  1.53 
Leather (31)  -0.87  -0.95  0.14 
Stone,  clay,  glass  (32)  -  1.21  -  1.25  -0.48 
Primary metals (33)  -2.63  -2.95  -  1.23 
Fabricated metals  (34)  -0.72  -  1.03  -0.50 
Nonelectrical  machinery  (35)  -0.59  -  0.69  -  0.25 
Electrical  machinery  (36)  -  0.62  -0.64  -  0.83 
Transportation equipment (37)  -  3.30  -  3.29  -2.16 
Instruments (38)  -  2.32  -  1.69  -  1.20 
Miscellaneous  manufactures (39)  -  0.85  -  1.13  -  1.32 
Sources:  Computed by the author as described  in the text. 
a.  Differences  between  productivity  growth rates in 1973-80 and  1953-73. 
down quite substantially  in all  the industries  except electrical  machinery 
and  miscellaneous  manufacturing. 
The decline in capacity utilization  for petroleum  refining  was very 
important.  This is a highly capital-intensive  industry,  and the demand 
for its product  has dropped  sharply  relative to capacity. It remains  the 
industry  with the largest  slowdown, however, even in terms  of KLP*. 
THE  PATTERN  OF  SLOWDOWN  IN  THE 
MANUFACTURING  INDUSTRIES 
The industries  can be grouped  by the magnitudes  of the slowdowns 
in short-run  KLP*, as shown below. 438  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1982 
Productivity slowdown 
(percentage points per year)  Industry 
No slowdown,  2.16 to 0.14  Furniture,  leather,  apparel 
Small, -0.25  to -0.83  Nonelectrical  machinery;  stone, clay, 
and  glass;  fabricated  metals; 
textiles;  electrical  machinery 
Medium,  -  1.19 to  -  1.85  Tobacco,  instruments, primary 
metals,  miscellaneous 
manufacturing,  rubber,  paper, 
food 
Large, - 2.16 to - 4.86  Transportation  equipment,  printing, 
lumber,  chemicals,  petroleum 
refining 
Just looking at the industry groups does not indicate a particular pattern. 
Two industries with substantial accelerations-apparel  and furniture- 
are a  surprise.  These  are not  usually  thought  of  as  high-technology 
industries in which the frontier can easily be pushed forward; nor is the 
leather industry, the other industry whose productivity accelerated. The 
apparel and leather industries have faced a lot of foreign competition, 
but so have primary metals and transportation equipment, while furniture 
has not been  so affected.  As  before,  there is a hint that regulation is 
important;  productivity  slowed  substantially  in  petroleum  refining, 
chemicals,  and transportation equipment. 
THE  SLOWDOWN,  CAPITAL  INTENSITY,  AND 
PREVIOUS  PRODUCTIVITY  GROWTH 
Two hypotheses  were offered above: if capital services have declined 
generally  in relation  to  the  capital  stock,  productivity  in the capital- 
intensive  industries  will  have  been  especially  hard  hit;  and  if  the 
possibilities  for technical  advance  have diminished because  American 
industries have matured, the productivity slowdowns  should have been 
greatest in those industries in which productivity growth was most rapid 
before 1973. 
Figures 1 and 2 are scatter diagrams that examine these ideas for the 
cross-section  of  manufacturing industries.19 The  capital-intensity  hy- 
19. The tobacco industry  has a nonlabor  share  reported  by John  Kendrick  and Elliot 
Grossman  that  is completely  different  from  the industry's  reported  capital-labor  ratio.  For 
the other  industries  the income shares  and  capital  intensities  are closely related.  It seems 
that the labor share provides  a misleading  estimate of the parameter  of the production Martin  Neil  Baily  439 
Figure 1. Productivity  Growth Slowdown  and Capital Intensity, by Manufacturing 
Industrya 
Change in adjusted KLP growth 
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Source:  Same as table 2. 
a.  The  productivity  growth  slowdown  is  the  difference  between  KLP*  growth  rates  in  1973-81  and  1953-73. 
Manufacturing industry 20 is food;  21,  tobacco;  22,  textiles;  23,  apparel; 24,  lumber; 25,  furniture; 26,  paper; 27, 
printing; 28, chemicals;  29, petroleum refining; 30, rubber; 31, leather; 32, stone,  clay,  glass; 33, primary metals; 34, 
fabricated metals; 35, nonelectrical machinery; 36, electrical machinery; 37, transportation equipment; 38, instruments; 
39, miscellaneous  manufacturers.  For the tobacco  industry the nonlabor share was imputed as indicated in note  19, 
and the KLP is not adjusted for capacity  utilization. 
pothesis is supported. There is a distinct negative relation evident in 
figure 1. Furthermore,  a simple regression of the slowdown in KLP* 
growth on the nonlabor share of income yields a t-statistic of more 
than  6. 
function  for  tobacco. This  industry  is inserted  into  figure  1  using  a nonlabor  share  imputed 
from  its capital-labor  ratio. 440  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1982 
Figure 2.  Productivity  Growth Slowdown  and Past Productivity  Growth, by 
Manufacturing  Industrya 
Change  in adjusted  KLP  growth 
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Source:  Same as table 2. 
a.  See  figure 1, note a. 
Figure  2 does reveal a tendency  for the industries  with rapid  adjusted 
KLP growth in 1953-73 (the ones on the steep portion of the S-curve 
shown above) to have experienced  a larger  slowdown:  a simple  regres- 
sion shows a negative correlation  with a t-statistic  of more than 2. But 
the relation is much weaker than that of figure 1. In a regression  with 
both nonlabor  share  and  pre-1973  growth  as independent  variables,  only 
the nonlabor share retains statistical significance. The apparel (23), 
furniture  (25), and petroleum refining (29) industries accentuate the Martin Neil  Baily  441 
negative  correlations  in both  figures.  But  even with  these three  excluded 
from  figure  1, there remains  a clear negative  correlation.  In figure  2 the 
scatter is basically horizontal  without industries  23, 25, and 29. Thus 
there is little evidence that the process by which technology affects 
production  is captured  by the industry  cross-sectional  model, so that  the 
role of technical change in the productivity slowdown has not been 
resolved. However, the fact that adjusted  KLP  slowed in almost all 
industries  does suggest that the slowdown came mainly from sources 
other than technical change; in this model, a slowdown in technical 
change  would  have little effect on the performance  of mature  industries. 
Even though figure 1 is consistent with the hypothesis that capital 
services have declined, it also reveals  that  this hypothesis  is incomplete. 
The data imply a positive intercept  and a rather  steep slope to the line 
relating  the slowdown  to the nonlabor  share.  A more  plausible  line  would 
have a zero or small  negative  intercept  and  be fairly  flat, consistent  with 
no acceleration  of technical  change and a modest rate of decline of the 
ratio of capital services to capital stock.20  Developments  in technology 
that are industry-specific  and not part of the model probably  explain 
this. For example, the development  of new adhesives is said to be one 
reason why furniture  has shown accelerating  growth, but since this is 
not accounted  for, the result is a rise in the estimated  intercept.  Energy 
and regulation  may explain why transportation  equipment  (37), chemi- 
cals (28), and petroleum  refining  (29)  have had such large  slowdowns. If 
these missing  elements  could  be incorporated  in the analysis,  the implied 
parameter  estimates  would  be more  plausible.  Despite  this shortcoming, 
however, the key finding  remains.  The hypothesis  of a decline  in capital 
services predicts that the most capital-intensive  industries will have 
been hardest hit. Within manufacturing,  that prediction is certainly 
borne  out. 
MEASUREMENT  PROBLEMS  IN  THE  COMPUTER  INDUSTRY 
The real  production  of computers  (part  of nonelectrical  machinery)  is 
not correctly measured.  Technological  change has been so rapid  in the 
computer  industry  that the Bureau  of Labor Statistics and the Depart- 
20. After this paper  was completed,  Zvi Griliches  suggested  to me that textiles (22) 
and  apparel  (23)  and also furniture  (25)  and  lumber  (24) should  be combined  to make  two 
composite  industries  because  the  data  are  not  good  enough  to separate  them.  His  suggestion 
would  improve  figure  1  by pulling  in the two outliers,  (23)  and  (25). 442  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1982 
ment of Commerce  have not been able to develop an adequate  output 
price index. Arbitrarily,  the price of computers  in nominal  dollars  has 
been assumed  to be roughly  constant since the early 1970s.  The deflator 
for office, computing,  and accounting  machinery  (OCAM)  was 99.6 in 
1971  and 103.0 in 1980. Real gross investment in such machinery  was 
$15.8  billion  in 1980  (1972  dollars)  and $16.3 billion  in current  dollars. 
No one has a good price index for the OCAM  industry  but a recent 
study  by Michael  McKee has proposed  an alternative  index  that  implies 
that the official value of 103.0  for 1980  might  be three to four times too 
high.21  This would mean that the price of the output of the OCAM 
industry  was declining  at over 20 percent a year relative  to the price of 
other producer  durables.  This is a rather  steep decline and represents 
about  the limit  of plausibility. 
But suppose one accepts the suggested  alternative  price index. How 
much  difference  would that make? 
McKee factors in his price index by  using 1972 dollars as  the 
appropriate  measure  of output. He finds  that the rapidly  declining  price 
implies  that the real gross output  of the OCAM  industry  was $57  billion 
(1972 dollars) in 1980. This compares with the official figures  of $15.8 
billion  and $16.3 billion  cited above. McKee points out that adding  $41 
billion to real goods output in 1980  eliminates  any overall productivity 
slowdown  in manufacturing,  with room  to spare. 
There are two problems  with this procedure.  The first  is a technical 
one. When relative prices change dramatically,  the usual method of 
calculating  output in 1972  dollars can quickly become absurd  because 
the weights assigned to each product  are soon very far out of line. $57 
billion (1972  dollars)  would represent  over 8 percent  of total real goods 
output  in 1980.  But in nominal  dollars,  computers  amounted  to only 1.4 
percent  of total goods output.  The alternative  price  index has ballooned 
not only the growth rate of the OCAM  industry,  but also its weight in 
the total. A more appropriate  procedure  is to use a divisia chain index, 
dividing goods output into computers and everything  else. Using the 
divisia index and the alternative  price index for computers  reduces the 
productivity  slowdown in manufacturing  by only 0.3 percentage  point 
compared  to the slowdown  using  the official  data. 
21. Michael  J.  McKee, "Computer  Prices  in  the  National  Accounts:  Are  Our  Economic 
Problems  a Computer  Error?"  (Council  of Economic  Advisers, 1982). Martin Neil  Baily  443 
The second problem with using the alternative  price index occurs 
because computers  are  capital  goods. If the output  of computers  is being 
understated,  then so is investment  and  the capital  stock-the  same  issue 
that arose for productivity  in construction.  In the short  run, an error  in 
measuring  computer output will cause KLP to be understated,  too, 
because an extra dollar  of computer  output  adds a full dollar  to output 
immediately, while an extra dollar of capital reduces the estimate of 
KLP  by much less than a dollar. Over time, however, the error in 
measuring  the capital stock becomes cumulatively  larger, since com- 
puters last more than a year. If computer  output is being understated, 
the KLP  slowdown becomes even greater  and more puzzling as time 
goes on. 
ENERGY  USE  IN  MANUFACTURING 
The effort  to economize on energy  following  its price  increases  in the 
1970s  may have caused a decline in the flow of output-producing  capital 
services relative  to the measured  capital  stock, or it may  have influenced 
productivity  in other ways. Energy could be economized by reducing 
energy-intensive  operations  or by diverting  resources  to energy  conser- 
vation from other uses. In the absence of more direct  evidence on such 
responses, I analyzed pre-1973 energy intensity and an estimate of 
energy  conservation  actually  achieved. I used the recently  released  data 
from  the Department  of Commerce  that  gives annual  energy  consumption 
by two-digit manufacturing  industries  for detailed types of energy for 
1958-77.22  I divided  the types  of energy consumed  into fourteen cate- 
gories  and  then  calculated  a divisia  index  of energy  use for  each  industry, 
using  expenditure  shares  as weights. 
The importance  of energy  was assessed by looking  at the correlation 
between energy intensity and the slowdown and by determining  how 
much energy has been saved. Energy intensity was measured  by the 
ratio of expenditure  on energy to value added in 1973,  both in current 
dollars.  Table  3 gives the energy  intensities  by industry  in percent.  There 
is a statistically  significant  correlation  between the size of the slowdown 
by industry  and  energy  intensity  (a t-statistic  of 2.1). But the association 
is not as strong  as for capital  intensity. 
22. I am grateful  to Joseph Correia  of the Department  of Commerce,  Bureau of 
Industrial  Economics,  for supplying  the data  tape  and  assisting  in its use. 444  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  2:1982 
Table 3.  Productivity Slowdown, Energy Intensity, and Energy Conservation 
Rank in  Energy  Energy 
productivity  Industry and  intensity  conservation 
slowdowna  classification  number  (percent)b  (ratio)c 
1  Petroleum refining (29)  19.84  ... 
2  Chemicals  (28)  17.45  1.19 
3  Lumber (24)  5.24  0.84 
4  Printing (27)  2.50  0.63 
5  Transportation equipment  (37)  1.99  0.47 
6  Food  (20)  5.14  1.01 
7  Paper (26)  10.88  0.85 
8  Rubber (30)  4.42  0.52 
9  Miscellaneous  manufactures  (39)  3.18  0.60 
10  Primary metals  (33)  20.65  0.61 
11  Instruments  (38)  0.91  0.82 
12  Tobacco  (21)  0.83  1.01 
13  Electrical  machinery  (36)  2.31  0.62 
14  Textiles  (22)  5.26  0.74 
15  Fabricated  metals (34)  2.75  0.58 
16  Stone,  clay,  glass  (32)  11.41  0.65 
17  Nonelectrical  machinery  (35)  2.21  0.72 
18  Leather  (31)  2.60  0.78 
19  Apparel (23)  2.48  0.51 
20  Furniture (25)  2.52  0.62 
Source:  Computed by the author as described  in the text. 
a.  Based  on KLP* slowdown  from table 2.  Rank 1 is the largest slowdown;  rank 20 is the largest acceleration  in 
productivity growth. 
b.  Expenditure on energy  as a percent of value  added in 1973, both in current dollars. 
c.  Ratio of energy  actually used  in 1977 to energy  use  projected from pre-1973 trends and actual  1977 output. 
There  were marked  trends  in energy  productivity  before 1970,  so that 
to know how much energy has been saved required  an estimate  of how 
much energy would have been used with no price increases. The 
logarithm  of energy productivity-the  ratio of output (value added in 
1972  dollars)  to the  quantity  of energy  used-was  regressed  on  a quadratic 
in time over the 1958-72  period. The fitted  value from the equation  for 
1977  was then taken as the estimate of what energy productivity,  and 
hence energy use, would have been in the absence of subsequent  price 
increases. Energy  conservation  is measured  as the ratio  of actual  energy 
use in 1977  to this estimate of what  it would  have been. 
Table 3 gives the resulting  measures of conservation  by industry.23 
The  table  shows that  there  was a substantial  effort  at  energy  conservation 
23. There were discontinuities  in the data for petroleum  refining  that seemed to 
invalidate  the computation  of energy  use over the full 1958-77  period. Martin Neil  Baily  445 
relative to the pre-1973  trends. Energy use in 1977  was below what it 
would have been, given output, for all industries except three. This 
shows that energy saving was pervasive and is consistent with the idea 
that efforts to save energy contributed  to the widespread  weakness in 
productivity.  There is no correlation,  however, between the pattern  of 
energy conservation  by industry  and the magnitudes  of the slowdown 
by industries. 
The fact that a worldwide  productivity  slowdown  began  shortly  after 
the price of energy increased in 1973 makes one suspect energy of 
contributing  to the productivity slowdown. And large slowdowns in 
industries  that feel the impact  of energy  prices, such as public  utilities, 
mining, petroleum refining, chemicals and transportation  equipment, 
strengthen  the suspicion.  However, the examination  here  of the detailed 
energy  consumption  data  by industry  does not reinforce  that  case. These 
data make energy look more like an accessory and less like the prime 
suspect. More careful  treatment  of the behavior  of energy  productivity 
before the price increases might change the conclusions, but this is 
doubtful.  The basic data  just do not show a pattern  of conservation  that 
coincides with the pattern  of the slowdown. It is possible that conser- 
vation patterns  have changed substantially  since 1977  or that environ- 
mental regulation has affected energy consumption (in the chemical 
industry,  for example).  Alternatively  energy  conservation  may  be easier 
in some industries than in others so that differences in the ease of 
conservation,  rather  than  in the amount  of resources  devoted to it, may 
explain  the difference  in the conservation  achieved. But these possibil- 
ities remain  to be shown. 
Effects of Changes in Industry Mix 
In this section, I turn to the fourth and final question posed at the 
beginning  of this paper.  It has been suggested  by William  Nordhaus  that 
changes in the shares of output and employment  by industry  can have 
important  effects on aggregate  productivity  that  are separate  from  what 
is happening  within  the particular  industries  making  up the aggregate.24 
24. William  D. Nordhaus,  "The Recent  Productivity  Slowdown,"  BPEA,  3:1972,  pp. 
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This argument  has also been important  from a policy perspective. The 
importance  of changes in industry shares has been cited to support  a 
U.S. industrial  policy favoring  industries  with high productivity  levels 
or rapid  growth  rates.25 
The standard  way of estimating  industry-mix  effects was presented 
by Nordhaus  and  can be illustrated  with  a simple  model  like  the one used 
earlier. There are n sectors,  i =  1, . .  .,  n.  Output and labor input for the 
ith sector are Qi  and  Li, respectively. The output  of the ith sector is sold 
at a price ai in the base period, so that  total  real  output  for the economy, 
Q,  is given by26 
(13)  Q =  IEiQi. 
Then define ALP  as average labor productivity  for the economy as a 
whole (Q/E Li), ALPi as the same for the ith sector (1TjQj/Lj),  Oi  as the 
share of the ith sector in total output, and Si as the share of the labor 
input in the ith sector. It follows that the rate of growth in labor 
productivity  is 
(14)  alp  =  i  ~  alpi  +  (ALPA  dSt  (ALP / dt 
ALPS  dSi  =  ialpi  +  E(0i  -  6i)alpi  + E  (AP-  1)di,  ALP  /dt  9 
where Oi  is the share  in 1972  of the ith sector in total output.  The second 
line follows from  the first  because the sum  of the changes  in labor  shares 
is  zero.  The expression indicates that the rate of growth of labor 
productivity  for the economy as a whole is a weighted average of the 
rates  of growth  of the individual  sectors  with  fixed  (1972)  output  weights, 
plus a term that is positive if the output shares are growing  in sectors 
with above-average rates of labor productivity  growth, plus another 
term  that  is positive if the labor  shares  are  growing  in sectors  with  above- 
average  levels of labor  productivity.  The results of decomposing  aggre- 
gate  labor  productivity  in the way indicated  by equation  14  for  the  private 
business economy are shown in table 4 for various periods. The final 
25. Lester C. Thurow, "Solving the Productivity  Problem," and Arnold Packer, 
"Productivity  and Structural  Change,"  in Center  for Democratic  Policy, Strengthening 
the Economy: Studies in Productivity (Washington, D.C.,  1981), pp. 9-19,  20-27. 
26. The overall  price  level is normalized  to equal  unity. Martin Neil  Baily  447 
term  in equation  14 is split into two parts  in table  4, the farm  sector and 
the sum of the nonfarm  sectors. 
The first  result  to note in table  4 is that  the effect of changes  in output 
shares on the overall growth rate of productivity  is trivial. The term 
(0i -  O4)alpi  is small in all periods, and it actually  turned  positive after 
1973.  The simple  reason for this outcome is that output  shares  have not 
changed  that much. Manufacturing  produced  30.4 percent of real busi- 
ness output  in 1948  and  30.7  percent  in 198  1. For  the same  years, services 
produced 13.3 percent and 14.8 percent; trade produced 19.5 percent 
and  21.2 percent. Those three sectors account  for  two-thirds  of business 
output.27  Of the remainder,  communications  and public utilities have 
grown  in importance,  and agriculture,  railroads,  and construction  have 
declined  in output  shares. 
These findings  may be surprising  given that it is frequently  alleged 
that the increased size of stagnant  industries  has played a major  role in 
the overall  productivity  story.28  Some  people  look at employment  shares 
rather  than output shares, but this is a misleading  procedure.  Think  of 
an economy in which 90 percent of the output is produced by an 
automated  industry  requiring  only one employee. What  happens  in this 
automated  sector will dominate  the aggregate  productivity  picture, but 
its employment  share  is trivial.  Others  look at total GNP, for which the 
growth  in government  and  nonbusiness  services may well have contrib- 
uted somewhat  to the growth  slowdown  in aggregate  productivity. 
The second finding  shown in table 4 is that the industry-mix  effect 
associated  with movements  of labor  among  sectors with different  levels 
of average  labor  productivity  did apparently  contribute  to the slowdown 
in overall growth after 1965. The cessation of favorable mix effects 
contributed  - 0.22 percentage  point  to a total slowdown  of - 0.71 point, 
with the farm  sector alone contributing  most of the - 0.22 point. 
The  contribution  of changes  in  the  mix  term  to the  post-1973  slowdown 
is somewhat  smaller  and, of course, the slowdown  itself is much  larger. 
The  term I  O1alpi  contributes  -  1.84 to  a total  slowdown  of  -  1.99. 
Nevertheless, the impact  of the winding  down of favorable  shift effects 
27. Data  are provided  by Elliot S. Grossman.  They include  allocation  of government 
enterprises  output. 
28. See William  J. Baumol  and Edward  Wolff, "On the Theory  of Productivity  and 
Unbalanced  Growth"  (New York  University,  November  1979). -  r  -  0  t  0  - 
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from  the farm  sector alone has about  the same absolute  contribution  to 
the post-1973  slowdown as it did to the slowdown  after 1965. 
AN  ALTERNATIVE  APPROACH  TO  INDUSTRY-MIX  EFFECTS 
The  problem  with  the above method  of evaluating  industry-mix  effects 
is that  it is based on average  labor  productivity.  The method  implies  that 
productivity  gains can be achieved by reallocating  resources  as long as 
average  labor  productivities  differ  across industries.  But in fact produc- 
tive efficiency  requires  that  the marginal  products  of factors  are  equated. 
If the labor shares are changing,  so that the final  term of equation 14 is 
nonzero, changes in labor  shares  will also be having  an effect on alpi. If 
marginal  products  are equated  everywhere,  then small  changes  in labor 
shares  will  have no effect on productivity  at all. The  final  term  in  equation 
14  will be exactly offset by changes in alpi. This and  other  issues can be 




The only difference  between this and  the earlier  formulation  is that  I am 
not dealing here with the issue of the ratio of capital services to the 
capital  stock. In equation 15, Ki is the stock of capital  in industry  i, and 
4, is the rate of change of KLP in industry  i. Labor  productivity  growth 
for the economy as a whole is now given by 
(16)  alp  =  Oj[jj +  (I  -  ot)(ki -  1I)]  +  E  (ALPi  dSt  yALP!  dt 
These two terms  correspond  to the two terms  in the first  line of equation 
14. But if capital  and  labor  are efficiently  allocated  among  sectors of the 
economy, this expression simplifies  to 
(17)  alp  =  ,  Oj4j +  (1 -  xi)(k -  1)] 
-  4 +  (1 -  &)(k -  1), 
where  k -  l =  the growth rate of the overall capital-labor ratio 
= weighted  average  of the sectoral  rates  of KLP  growth 
(  = the overall  labor  share  of income. 
Unlike 14, equation 17 is not an identity. It holds only if factors are 
allocated  efficiently  among  sectors with  Cobb-Douglas  production  func- 
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from movements of labor among sectors with different  average labor 
productivities has dropped out completely with the assumption that 
marginal  products  equate. Rates of KLP growth  and the overall  rate of 
capital  formation  are the only things  that  matter. 
Over a period  of years, changes in the allocation  of resources  among 
sectors  are  not  infinitesimal  and  base-year  prices  fail  to reflect  the  relative 
values of the different  outputs.  It is not always  clear  how these problems 
will affect measured  productivity,  but a general  presumption  is that  real 
output  calculated  from  base-period  prices  is biased  downward  by changes 
in the output mix and in relative prices. For changes over a period of 
several years, equation 17 would not hold exactly even if the other 
assumptions  of the model were correct. 
Another  way in which equation 17  may fail to hold is that wage rates 
may not equalize across industries. For example, in 1980  hourly  com- 
pensation  was $4.53  in  farming  and  $9.43  in  the  nonfarm  business  sector.29 
It  is not  certain  how much  of this  wage  differential  represents  inefficiency. 
The observed wage reflects the return  to human  capital as well as to 
labor. Because of unions and other institutional  factors, however, it is 
likely that wage distortions  exist and, in particular,  much of the above 
gap between farm  and nonfarm  wages reflects  excess farm  labor. 
The n-sector model can be modified to allow for unequal wages. 
Suppose there are two sectors and sector 1 is high-wage,  with the ratio 
of the sector 1 wage to the sector 2 wage given by 13> 1. Then overall 
labor  productivity  growth  is 
(18)  alp  =  4 +  (1 -  o)(k-  1) + (1 -)202(-S2), 
where s denotes the rate of change in the share  of the labor  input  in the 
ith  sector. If the share  of employment  is declining  in  the low-wage  sector, 
this will augment  overall labor productivity  depending  upon the wage 
differential  (1 -  1), and the ratio of the wage bill in sector 2 to total 
output  ((x202). 
AN  ALTERNATIVE  ESTIMATE  OF  INDUSTRY-MIX  EFFECTS 
The  modeljust  developed  can  provide  an  alternative  way of estimating 
the importance  of mix effects. Consider  the following  decomposition  of 
labor  productivity  growth  in the private  business sector  of the economy, 
where  the subscriptf represents  the farm  sector: 
29. Data  provided  by the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics. Martin Neil  Baily  451 
(19)  alp=4+(  -  +  + (1 -  o)(k  -1)  + (a7  -  o)(k-  1) 
+ (13  -  l)xfOf(-sf)  + residual. 
This equation  is not estimated;  instead  each term  is computed  and then 
the residual  is the part  of alp left over. The first  term, 4),  is the weighted 
average  of the KLP growth  rates of the major  sectors using  fixed (1972) 
output  weights. The second term, (+ -  )),  is positive (negative)  if the 
output shares have been growing  (falling)  in sectors with high rates of 
KLP  growth  (not necessarily  high  rates of labor  productivity  growth). 
The term (1 -  'a)(k -  1) gives  the contribution  of capital to labor 
productivity  growth with a fixed (1972)  income share coefficient. In a 
model  with  Cobb-Douglas  functions  in  individual  sectors,  the  only  reason 
for the factor shares to change is a change in the mix of output. In this 
case the term ((x -  &)(k -  1) is positive  if the labor share of income has 
declined  over time, that is, if the profit  share  of income  has risen. If the 
industry  output shares are increasing  (decreasing)  in sectors with large 
capital coefficients, a given rate of increase of the capital-labor  ratio 
adds more (less) to labor  productivity  growth. 
In practice, the profit share has fallen somewhat, both overall and 
within  the major  sectors of the economy, so that  the data  do not exactly 
fit  the model. This may result, in part,  from  mix effects within  the major 
sectors, and  in  part  from  an  elasticity  of substitution  different  from  unity. 
Thus  the fourth  term  in equation  19  combines  the effect of the interaction 
between output-mix  changes  and  capital  accumulation  with  the effect of 
changes  in the opportunities  for capital-labor  substitution. 
The fifth  term  attempts  to capture  the positive contribution  to growth 
resulting  from  the movement  of labor  away  from  farming,  where 3 is the 
ratio of hourly compensation  in the nonfarm  sector to hourly  compen- 
sation  in the farm  sector. This  term  probably  overstates  or  puts an  upper 
bound  on the farm-mix  effect because  part  of the wage  differential  in fact 
reflects  a human  capital  differential. 
The residual  captures  all remaining  effects, which  include  the follow- 
ing: (1) efficiency  gains or losses resulting  from  the reallocation  of labor 
within the nonfarm  sector, (2) efficiency gains or losses resulting  from 
the reallocation  of capital, and (3) measurement  effects resulting  from 
the use of base-year  prices and errors  in the assignment  of value added 
among  industries. 
Table 5 shows the results of decomposing  labor  productivity  growth 
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from  table 4. It shows that changes in output  weights have had a trivial 
impact  on productivity  growth.  The difference  between  + and  4 is small 
in all periods. It actually  contributed  positively to productivity  growth 
in 1977-81.  The term ((x -  O'0(k  -  1) is even  smaller and has had no 
appreciable  effect on productivity  growth  in any period. The decline in 
capital share has not been enough to make much difference. These 
findings  parallel  those of table  4. 
The breakdown  into KLP and a capital stock contribution  was not 
made  in table 5, but the results could have been anticipated  from what 
has  already  been discovered  about  KLP growth  by industry.  The  slowing 
in the ratio of growth of the capital stock to labor  has played a modest 
role in the slower growth  of labor  productivity.  Still, more than  half of 
the total post-1965  slowdown and three-quarters  of the post-1973  slow- 
down are reflected  in the single  term, 4. 
The measure of the impact of the shift out of farming  is smaller  in 
table 5 than in table 4.  It does seem that the average productivity 
approach overstates this shift effect. The residual column actually 
contributes  about the same amount  to the two slowdowns as does the 
farm  sector column, and its interpretation  is not entirely  clear. My own 
view is that  the substantial  contribution  to growth  (0.33  percentage  point) 
during  1948-53  reflects  real  gains  from  the reallocation  of resources.  The 
negative  terms after 1973  probably  reflect  index number  problems.  The 
period  from 1973  on was one of substantial  relative  price changes. 
To summarize  this section, it is preferable  to calculate  the effects of 
changes in output and employment shares from a model based on 
production  functions  that  assume  marginal  products  are  equated,  unless 
there  is some specific  reason  to think  otherwise.  However, by either  this 
method  of calculation  or by a method  that keeps average  productivities 
unchanged  as industry shifts take place, industry-mix  effects do not 
account  for much  of the slowdown  in productivity  growth  after 1973. 
Conclusions 
After 1973,  labor  productivity  growth  slowed by 2 percentage  points 
in the private business sector of the U.S. economy.30  In the analytical 
30. This  is reported  in table  5 and  elsewhere. ON  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  O 
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framework  it was shown that the rate of labor productivity  growth is 
equal to the rate of KLP growth  plus the nonlabor  share  multiplied  by 
the growth rate of the capital-labor  ratio. The theory presented  in the 
section on industry-mix  effects then derived  an aggregate  version  of this 
relation  and showed in table 5 that - 0.26 percentage  point of the total 
slowdown  in  labor  productivity  growth  came  from  a decline  in  the  growth 
rate  of the ratio  of capital  stock to labor  input. 
Table 5 also shows that an additional  - 0.24 percentage  point of the 
slowdown was caused by various changes in the industry shares of 
output  and  employment.  The remaining  -  1.50  percentage  points, about 
three-quarters  of the total slowdown,  is attributed  to declines  in the rates 
of KLP growth. 
This paper examines three possible explanations  for the declines in 
the rates of KLP growth in the major  industry  groups and in the two- 
digit  manufacturing  industries.  The  first  explanation  is that  weak  demand 
has depressed  productivity,  and  based upon  the results  reported  in table 
1  for the major  industries,  this explanation  accounts  roughly  for a further 
- 0.22 percentage  point of the slowdown.3' 
The remaining  two suggested explanations  of the slowdown  in KLP 
growth  were structural-a decline in the rate of technical  change and a 
decline in the capital services ratio. The results in this paper do not 
reveal how much of the remaining  slowdown in the private business 
sector might  be attributable  to each of these two and how much is left 
unexplained. 
In earlier  work I suggested some reasons why capital  services might 
have declined. I pointed to the market  value of corporate  capital  as an 
indicator  that  this had  in  fact occurred.  In  this  paper  I show  that  a general 
decline in capital services relative to the capital stock carries a clear 
prediction  that the incidence of the slowdown across industries  would 
be correlated  with  their  capital  intensities.  For  the manufacturing  sector, 
this prediction  is fulfilled. suggesting  that a decline in capital services 
has been an important  cause of the slowdown. 
31. The  average  effects  of the  cyclical  adjustments  in  table  1  were  computed  by  forming 
a weighted  average  of the differences  between  the second  and  third  columns.  The  weights 
were the 1972  output  shares. Comments 
and Discussion 
William D. Nordhaus: Nobody in this room last year knew that there 
was going to be an international  financial  crisis, but I think  everybody 
knew that there was a productivity  slowdown. This paper represents 
another stanza in the profession's epic quest to understand  that slow- 
down. Martin  Baily has been one of the crusaders  in this quest and, in 
this paper, reports  some of the  jewels he brought  back  from  his sacking 
of the data  banks  at the Department  of Commerce. 
As an aside, it appears  to me that  there  may have been some rebound 
in cyclically adjusted  labor productivity  growth in the last year and a 
half or so, with a pickup  perhaps  from zero to the neighborhood  of 1.5 
percent a year for nonfarm  business. But that is an extremely short 
period  and  the slowdown  is still  a very  stubborn  and  important  unresolved 
problem. 
Baily looks at a number  of possible contributors  to the slowdown. 
One idea that he does not find much support for is that the rate of 
fundamental  innovation or total factor productivity  itself has slowed 
down over the past twenty years. I have for some time thought  that  this 
was a reasonable  hypothesis, but admit  the evidence for it is flimsy.  My 
suspicion  that declining  inventiveness  may be an important  factor  rests 
on declining  patent  rates, declining  R&D  rates, and  my impression  that 
we have seen fewer fundamental  innovations  in the past ten or twenty 
years  than  in the early  postwar  period. 
I would make a somewhat different  cross-sectional test than Baily 
does in looking  for these effects. Assume the innovation  process strikes 
industries  randomly, like lightning  strikes. A fundamental  decline in 
innovation  would mean that there were fewer lightning  strikes. In this 
case, one would  see a decline  in the variance  across industries  in the rate 
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of productivity  growth.  I do not have the slightest  idea whether  that  has 
happened  or not. But the negative correlation  through  time that Baily 
looks for can arise from independence  of these lightning  strikes  as well 
as from  a decline in innovation. 
Baily has added to the evidence that inadequate  investment is not 
responsible for the productivity  slowdown, as does Bosworth in this 
same volume. I think the issue is fairly well settled, although  nobody 
except for a small  circle of academics  seems to be aware  of the evidence. 
The major  new result  in the paper  comes from  Baily'  s capital  intensity 
hypothesis.  The idea is something  like the following:  the usual  treatment 
of capital  productivity  or total factor  productivity  takes capital  services 
as proportional  to the capital  stock or some variant  of that. What  if there 
is a decline in capital  productivity  so that the ratio  of capital  services to 
capital  stock declines? If the decline is uniform  across industries,  those 
industries  that have the highest capital  intensity should  experience the 
biggest productivity  slowdown. Although  Baily does not derive much 
from his major  industry  breakdown,  I am struck  by how much of the 
relative productivity  slowdown across manufacturing  industries  is ex- 
plained  by their  capital  intensities  in his figure  1. And I have never seen 
that  kind  of result  before. Looking  at the figure,  it appears  that  a doubling 
of capital  intensity  is associated  with something  like a 1.5  percent  a year 
relative  deceleration  in productivity. 
The next point concerns the effect of interindustry  shifts in output. 
There are no major surprises  here. Baily confirms  the view that shift 
effects cannot account  for much  of the productivity  slowdown  in recent 
years. Similarly,  energy does not explain much of the cross-sectional 
variation  in productivity  performance.  Again, I find it no surprise  that 
he confirms  other  work showing  energy  is not responsible. 
Overall, Baily has produced some useful new evidence on the pro- 
ductivity mystery. I am particularly  struck by the capital-intensity 
phenomenon, and would recommend some hard thinking about its 
significance.  Aside from that, I had come to the conclusion, before this 
paper, that the productivity slowdown is  not a proper subject for 
macroeconomics, and he has not changed my mind. If one wants to 
discover the source of the slowdown, one has to look at the Boeing  707, 
the United Mine Workers,  economies of scale, speed limits of 55 miles 
an hour, and kitchen remodelings.  Technological  change may be too 
unstable  a process to find  a representation  in a conventional  econometric 
formulation. Martin Neil  Baily  457 
General Discussion 
Martin  Baily agreed  with William  Nordhaus  that  looking  at the cross- 
sectional variances of productivity growth in various periods might 
provide a test of the hypothesis that we are running  out of ideas. He 
reported that the cross-sectional variances of adjusted KLP growth 
within manufacturing  had not fallen after 1973, so the hypothesis was 
not supported.  Baily  also  pointed  out  that  an  explanation  of  the slowdown 
that  emphasized  disaggregation  and such specific  things  as the 55 MPH 
speed limit would have to account for the coincidence of so many 
industries  and  countries  slowing  down at about  the same time. 
A number  of discussants suggested that the productivity  slowdown 
might  have to be investigated  at a still more  disaggregated  level. Robert 
J. Gordon  described two industries  with which he was familiar  and in 
which  productivity  gains  had slowed-aircraft equipment  and  coal-fired 
power generation  equipment.  One issue illustrated  by both industries  is 
the consequence of running  out of technological  possibilities.  A second 
issue, illustrated  by industries  such as air  transportation  that  use aircraft 
equipment, is that the official statistics understate the productivity 
slowdown because of unmeasured  efficiency improvements  in their 
products through  the 1950s and 1960s. Such improvements  implicitly 
raised the true output of the industries  in those years compared  to the 
measured output. If unmeasured efficiency improvements  have not 
occurred  to the same  degree  in the 1970s,  the mystery  of the productivity 
slowdown only deepens. But William Brainard  observed that such 
unmeasured  gains could well be occurring  now with the technological 
revolution  in areas  like computers  and  communications. 
Alan  Blinder  suggested  it might  be especially  useful  to study  industries 
with homogeneous products. Many industrial  products such as enve- 
lopes, bolts, and  coal are  virtually  identical  in 1982  to their  counterparts 
in 1950, so that looking at their production  would avoid the kinds of 
measurement  problems  Gordon  raised.  Baily reasoned  that  such a focus 
would have a downward bias. Some of the industries  with the most 
standardized  outputs, such as the coal industry,  have shown the largest 
productivity  declines. And one would expect that the process of inno- 
vation would be faster in industries with new and evolving products 
rather  than in industries  in which products  remain  unchanged  for three 
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Despite the absence of any strong cross-sectional  relation  between 
energy and productivity  in Baily's results, Blinder  remained  impressed 
by the fact that  the productivity  slowdown  began  in many  industries  and 
across many different countries around  the time of the first oil price 
shock. He reasoned  that producers  in 1973  were probably  familiar  with 
alternative  production  technologies  in the neighborhood  of technologies 
then in current  use, but were doubtless far less knowledgeable  about 
technologies  appropriate  to the new energy  prices. Even though  similar 
relative  prices  had  been experienced  back  in the 1950s,  knowledge  about 
energy saving  technologies  had simply "rotted  away" from  lack of use. 
Lawrence Klein also doubted that the energy explanation  had been 
clearly disproven  either in this paper  or elsewhere. The coincidence of 
timing described by Blinder was simply too  striking to be entirely 
accidental.  Moreover,  despite Baily's weak results  with industry  cross- 
sections, Klein believed that some of the largest  drops in productivity 
growth have been in energy-intensive  industries. He argued  that one 
should look at industry  gross output in measuring  productivity  rather 
than  value added  because the latter  may be poorly  measured  as a result 
of price inflation;  moreover, value added  does not include  the interme- 
diate  energy  component  and should  be measured  on a gross basis so that 
energy is included  both on the output  and input  sides of the production 
relation. Baily agreed that gross output is better in principle,  but said 
that the only available  gross output data are heavily contaminated  by 
intra-industry  shipments. Klein also disliked Baily's assumption of 
constant returns to scale in the production  process, reasoning  that a 
more  general  specification  of the production  technology  should  be used, 
particularly  in periods when capital utilization fluctuated so widely. 
Christopher  Sims remarked  that it was actually  quite difficult  to deter- 
mine the energy intensity of an industry  because in computing  energy 
inputs  one must  take  into account  the energy  intensity  of all  intermediate 
goods used in an industry's  production  process. 
Barry  Bosworth  pointed  out that, to identify  weak productivity  since 
1973 with unforeseen obsolescence  of  capital, one would have to 
hypothesize  large  and continuing  episodes of unforeseen  obsolescence, 
not one major  event such as the first OPEC  oil price increase. A one- 
time loss of effective capital  after 1973  would not explain  the decline in 
the measured  rate of return  over the rest of the decade because normal 
depreciation  and  retirements  would, in any case, have removed  much  of Martin Neil  Baily  459 
that  capital  from  the statistics  by 1980.  For example,  if 25 percent  of the 
stock of equipment  became unexpectedly obsolete at the end of 1973, 
the measured value of total tangible assets in 1980 would be only 2 
percent in error. Baily replied that various supply shocks in the 1970s 
had  in fact been continuing  or recurrent.  For example, OPEC  raised  oil 
prices sharply  in 1973  and  then again  in 1979. 
Robert Solow observed that "divine providence" would have been 
the leading  candidate  to explain  the productivity  slowdown  not so many 
years ago. While  not taken seriously as an explanation  today, a variant 
is worth  considering.  It is possible that  we are  now experiencing  normal 
productivity  growth,  and  that  for a variety  of reasons, including  random 
error,  the 1950s  and 60s saw above-average  productivity  growth. 